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A computer system's security can be compromised in many ways—a 
denial-of-service attack can make a server inoperable, a worm can destroy 
a user's private data, or an eavesdropper can reap financial rewards by 
inserting himself in the communication link between a customer and her 
bank through a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. What all these 
scenarios have in common is that the adversary is an untrusted entity that 
attacks a system from the outside—we assume that the computers under 
attack are operated by benign and trusted users. But if we remove this 
assumption, if we allow anyone operating a computer system—from 
system administrators down to ordinary users—to compromise that 
system's security, we find ourselves in a scenario that has received 
comparatively little attention.  
Attacks by a trusted user on a computer system, called a man-at-the-end 
(MATE) scenario, can take many forms. In a tampering attack, an 
adversary violates the integrity of a piece of software under his control, 
perhaps by modifying it in ways the software vendor didn't intend. In a 
malicious reverse-engineering attack, he violates the vendor's 
confidentiality rights by extracting intellectual property from the 
software, such as algorithms, designs, or implementations. Finally, in a 
cloning attack, he violates copyright laws by making and distributing 
illegal copies of the software.  
Methods for protecting against MATE attacks are variously known as anti-
tamper techniques, digital asset protection, or, more commonly, software 
protection. 1 To protect against tampering attacks, tamper-proofing 
techniques look for modifications to a program, and when they find them, 
take offensive or defensive measures. For example, a tamper-proof 
program can repair itself, refuse to run, run but produce erroneous 
results, destroy objects in its environment, or "phone home" to alert the 
vendor that an integrity violation has taken place. To protect against 
reverse-engineering attacks, obfuscation techniques modify a program 
(once at compile-time or continuously at runtime) to make it harder for 
the adversary to analyze or comprehend. To protect against cloning 
attacks, software watermarking techniques modify a program to tie it 
uniquely to its legitimate user. Some software protection techniques are 
software-only, whereas others augment software-based protection 
techniques with various forms of tamper-resistant hardware, such as 
smart cards, trusted platform modules (TPMs), or crypto-processors.  
Software protection is increasingly becoming an important requirement 
for industrial software development, especially when building systems for 
military defense, national infrastructure, and medical informatics. Every 
software vendor should be aware of the potential for MATE-style attacks 
against its products and the techniques available to mitigate these attacks. 
Employing software protection techniques can mean the difference 
between business survival and failure. We're therefore pleased to present 
this special issue on new tools and techniques for software protection.  
 
Applications of Software Protection 
 
At its core, a MATE attack occurs when an adversary gains physical access 
to a device and compromises it by inspecting or tampering with the 
hardware itself or the software it contains. Historically, software 
protection first appeared as (often feeble) attempts at adding license-
checking code to computer games, followed by algorithms for white-box 
cryptography 2 used for digital-media piracy protection. Today, however, 
we see an increasing number of application areas susceptible to MATE 
attacks, along with a need for comprehensive software protection 
techniques that provide a nontrivial level of security against concerted 
attacks by accomplished adversaries.  
More and more, our national infrastructure relies on distributed software 
systems. An example is the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) that 
lets utility companies collect electricity usage information from users' so-
called smart meters. It also allows them, among other things, to shut 
down or limit services to a group of customers in response to power 
shortages. A MATE attack against a smart meter could not only help a 
user avoid paying electricity bills, but may also have more far-reaching 
consequences—for example, a terrorist who can compromise a smart 
meter could conceivably cause nationwide blackouts. 3 Likewise, with 
wireless sensor networks increasingly in use by the military to monitor 
combat zones, an adversary who can compromise a sensor node can insert 
false data into the system or refuse to forward data received from other 
sensors.  
Computer and video games now form a significant part of the US and 
world economies: in 2009, US retail sales of such games added $4.9 
billion to the US gross domestic product, 4 and in 2011, the US virtual-
goods market will reach $2.1 billion ( www.insidevirtualgoods.com/us-
virtual-goods). Thus, in the past, cheating in massively multiplayer online 
games was only a problem for game vendors concerned with losing 
revenue, but rampant counterfeiting of virtual goods could now devalue 
online currencies and by extension impact the global economy.  
Finally, our most private information, including our medical and financial 
records, is stored in electronic form. On the surface, it might seem that 
standard practices, such as encrypting transmitted documents, would be 
enough to guarantee the confidentiality and integrity of such records. 
However, this ignores MATE-style attacks that target the endpoints of 
data transmission. For example, in a medical record scenario, an 
adversary could bypass the two-factor authentication used to protect 
documents downloaded to a PC in a doctor's office (say, smart card plus 
password) by compromising the smart-card reader or the password-
checking software. This problem is exacerbated when documents are 
stored on mobile devices, such as laptops and PDAs, outside a physically 
secured environment. Similar issues arise for classified military 
documents or documents containing confidential intellectual property.  
 
Techniques for Software Protection 
The software protection problem is fundamentally harder (and, under 
very general circumstances, impossible to solve 5 ) than other, more 
commonly studied security problems. The reason is the very liberal attack 
model that software protection researchers and practitioners must 
contend with: we must assume an all-powerful adversary who has full 
access to our software and hardware, and can examine, probe, and modify 
it at will. For this reason, no piece of software, however well protected, is 
expected to survive unscathed in the wild for an extended period of time. 
Thus, we can look forward to a situation in which we must continuously 
monitor the advances our adversaries make and invent new software 
protection techniques to counter these advances. Designing such 
renewable protection techniques is at the forefront of software protection 
research.  
Software protection algorithms fall into four basic categories: code 
obfuscation to make programs harder to reverse engineer, tamper-
proofing to make programs harder to modify, watermarking to allow 
programs to be tracked, and birthmarking to detect code that has been 
lifted from one program into another. Hardware-supported protection 
techniques can be used to augment software-based methods.  
Fred Cohen first discussed code obfuscation as a technique for 
automatically creating multiple versions of the same program, thereby 
making each version a more difficult target for malware to analyze and 
modify. 6 Ironically, today's viruses use such code diversity to deter 
analysis by virus scanners. Typical code obfuscation techniques include 
splitting code into smaller pieces, merging pieces of unrelated code, 
randomizing code placement, randomizing instruction selection, breaking 
abstraction boundaries, mapping original data structures to cloaked ones, 
and flattening or introducing bogus control flow. 7 Obfuscating code 
transformations can be either static (done at compile time) or dynamic 
(performed continuously during runtime). 8  
Tamper-proofing techniques fall into three basic categories. Introspection 
techniques check the integrity of executable code, often by computing a 
checksum over the code and comparing to an expected value. Higher 
levels of protection can be achieved by including a large number of 
redundant and overlapping checkers. 9 Oblivious techniques indirectly 
verify code integrity by checking that the data values the code computes, 
along with paths taken through the code, are correct. 10 Finally, 
environment-checking techniques verify that the program is running on 
an operating system and hardware that are unadulterated and won't 
violate code integrity. Tamper-proofing is often combined with 
obfuscation. This not only makes the program hard to understand (and 
hence modify!) but also helps hide any inserted tamper-proofing code 
from the adversary.  
Other works have introduced a trusted server to provide remote 
attestation of client integrity, by extending these tamper-proofing 
techniques for distributed systems 11 or by detecting anomalous execution 
times. 12 Watermarking techniques embed an identifier, known as the 
fingerprint, into every distributed copy of a program. This fingerprint 
uniquely identifies who originally bought a particular copy of the 
program, allowing a pirated copy to be traced back to the original 
customer. Popular watermarking algorithms use a few simple program 
structures in which to encode the fingerprint: parts of the program can be 
reordered, nonfunctional code can be inserted, particular instruction 
sequences can be selected, and bogus data structures encoding the 
fingerprint can be built at runtime. Watermarking is often combined with 
tamper-proofing to make the fingerprint difficult to remove, as well as 
with obfuscation to make it difficult to locate.  
 
In This Issue 
The first article, "CodeBender: A Tool for Remote Software Protection 
Using Orthogonal Replacement" by Mariano Ceccato and Paolo Tonella, 
presents a tool that makes it possible for a remote trusted server to 
protect from tampering the client code running on a potentially malicious 
host. The approach consists of frequent replacement of the client code 
with code that's orthogonal in the sense that any analysis of the previous 
one would be of no benefit in attacking the new one (even though they 
have the same functionality). The adversary is prevented from 
circumventing such replacements by strongly coupling the client version 
with the trusted server, thereby making the replacement effectively 
mandatory.  
The second article, "The Trusted Platform Agent" by Giovanni Cabiddu, 
Emanuele Cesena, Roberto Sassu, Davide Vernizzi, Gianluca Ramunno, 
and Antonio Lioy, presents an open source library for writing applications 
that make effective use of tamper-resistant Trusted Platform Module 
chips, which are increasingly available on computers.  
The third article, "Guilty or Not Guilty: Using Clone Metrics to Determine 
Open Source Licensing Violations" by Akito Monden, Satoshi Okahara, 
Yuki Manabe, and Kenichi Matsumoto, explores various metrics for 
detecting whether commercial software contains open source software 
(thereby violating the open source license). This not only protects open 
source developers but also the commercial companies that are often 
unaware that their products contain such unauthorized use of software 
(outsourced production of software might be implicated). The metrics 
quantify the amount of cloning—the duplication of code fragments—that 
exists between two given software products.  
The fourth article, "Managing Copyrights and Moral Rights of Service-
Based Software" by G.R. Gangadharan and Vincenzo D'Andrea, deals with 
copyright issues arising in the software-as-a-service framework, 
particularly the facet involving the expression of usage and access rights 
via a service license based on ODRL-S, an extension of the ODRL open 
standard that's gaining wide acceptance.  
Finally, the Point/Counterpoint features Jean-Daniel Aussel and Reiner 
Sailer discussing the efficacy of hardware-assisted protections, and Yuan 
Xiang Gu, Bart Preneel, and Brecht Wyseur sharing their vision of the 
future of software-based protections.  
 
Conclusions 
Like many indispensable technologies, software protection can be a 
double-edged sword, particularly with malware increasingly resistant 
against reverse engineering and eradication. However, this only 
underscores the importance of software protection research—we must 
understand both black- and white-hat techniques for analysis of threats 
and protection of assets. We hope this issue educates and inspires both 
researchers and practitioners to push software protection forward, 
creating a more secure, stable foundation for the computing systems of 
today and tomorrow.  
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